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The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate1 presents what is likely to be the most complete
overview of phenomenology’s partake in debates over non-conceptual content
up to date. As the title indicates, the chapters of all fifteen contributors center
around McDowell’s conceptualist position, which was first exposed in detail in
the already highly influential work  Mind and  World2. Here McDowell argues
against any form of non-conceptual content,  a move motivated primarily by
what  Sellars3 had  dubbed  the  “Myth  of  the  Given”.  On  McDowell’s  (and
Sellars’s) understanding, characteristic of Modern philosophy is an ontological
separation  of  two realms  of  being.  Whereas  one  is  that  of  external  reality,
supposedly governed by natural law, the other is that of human action and free
spontaneity.  The  Modernist  sees  man’s  place  in  reality  in  accord with  this:
whereas the senses receive information from the external environment which
causally impinges upon the senses, our complex thoughts ultimately have to
relate  back  to  these  bare  data.  This  makes  the  function  of  sensations
ambiguously two-legged: whereas one has a foothold in thought, the other has
a grip in the natural world. The idea that bare sense data bridge the realm of
causal nature to thought and thus have an epistemic effect upon our beliefs is
what Sellars called the Myth of the Given. For twentieth century philosophers
such  as  Sellars  and  Davidson4,  the  price  for  this  image  is  too  high,  and
consequently  they  deny  that  the  bare  Givens  our  bodies  receive  from  the
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Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 2, n. 2 (2014)
ISSN 2281-9177
274                                                                                                        Corijn van Mazijk
McDowell,  both these thinkers still  cling onto the traditional  notion of bare
sense  data  too  much,  which  is  undesirably  reminiscent  of  Modern
epistemology. McDowell himself presents another solution: if we want to think
of  thoughts  as  bearing  onto  reality,  we  should  conceive  of  intuition  and
sensation as already conceptually structured, to the extent that nothing enters
experience that is not already “saddled” with concepts. This way, our concepts
and beliefs can still be said to touch upon the world that we sense and perceive,
but without having to invoke a non-conceptual Given to do the job. 
McDowell’s conceptualism thus serves the primary purpose of clarifying the
relation  between  mind  and  world  in  the  light  of  certain  epistemological
concerns. The main issue is the justificatory relation between representations
provided  by  intuition  and  the  beliefs  we  can  have  about  the  world.  By
conceiving of the contents of intuition as conceptual rather than as bare Givens,
McDowell thinks it is easier to understand how a perception could give one a
reason to belief that something is or is not the case. My perception of, say, the
cup of coffee in front of me, gives me a reason to belief that there is a cup of
coffee in front of me. By consistently claiming that all intuition is “saddled”
with concepts – thus that the content of my perception of the cup of coffee is
already conceptual – McDowell wishes both to clarify how intuition provides
reasons  for  belief  as  well  as  to  avoid  having  to  appeal  to  a  Given.  This
“saddledness”  of  intuition  is  then  explained  by  appeal  to  second  nature:
human beings are said to engage in a process of cultural development from
their birth onwards by which they attain conceptual knowledge that henceforth
comes to structure experience independently of the agent’s deliberate actions.
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  his  concerns  in  Mind  and  World  are  mostly
epistemological,  McDowell  has  had  a  notable  influence  on  philosophers  of
mind and also on phenomenologists interested in bridging phenomenology to
other areas of scholarly research. The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate  belongs to this
latter  field.  It  wishes  to  explore  what  phenomenologists  may contribute  to
ongoing  debates  on  non-conceptual  content,  with  a  special  focus  on  the
phenomenology  of  skillful  coping.  Generally  speaking,  many
phenomenologists have expressed their concerns about McDowell’s exclusion
of  non-conceptual  content.  Often,  they  feel  that  the  conceptualist  thesis
wrongly assesses human behavior as a thoroughly rational activity.
The  McDowell-Dreyfus  Debate  opens  with  Dreyfus’s  critical  reading  of
McDowell’s  rejection  of  non-conceptual  content,  which  is  supposed  to
constitute the backbone of the debates throughout the book. His criticisms, as
does the rest of the book by and large, essentially evolves the question of over-
intellectualization:  does  McDowell’s  conceptualism  falsely  present  human
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experience  as  governed  entirely  by  concepts  and  rationality?  Dreyfus’s
response is “yes”, an answer for which I take him to provide two arguments.
For the first, he draws mostly on examples of absorbed coping in the works of
Heidegger  and Merleau-Ponty.  For  instance,  the early  sections  of  Being and
Time,  where Heidegger analyzes the appearing of the world in its  ready-to-
handness,  seem  to  inspire  Dreyfus  in  that  they  reveal  a  mode  of  human
experience not mediated by concepts. We do not have to think about the door
in order to use it to leave the room. «Once a skill is acquired», Dreyfus writes,
«concepts used in learning the skill need play no further role» (p. 18). A bit
further on (p. 21), Dreyfus chooses to characterize such skillful copings as non-
conceptual. The reason for this is the specific nature of these acts, which are
characterized by a kind of absorption unknown to conceptual apprehensions.
Dreyfus’s second argument has essentially the same structure as the first, only
this time he focuses on situated normativity (pp. 23-27). To know one’s distance
from someone else in an elevator and to behave appropriately according to that
knowledge does not demand any concepts being put into play. As before, the
argument is that conceptual content rests on a kind of intentionality that is not
found in skillful coping. One consequence to be drawn from this, as Schear
more  explicitly  does  (pp.  294-299),  is  that  McDowell  over-intellectualizes
human  experience.  By  assuming  that  all  experience  is  based  on  a  kind  of
Brentanean/early Husserlian intentionality, McDowell cannot do justice to the
phenomenology of absorbed coping.
Dreyfus’s motives are existential-phenomenological: he wants to show that
we do not need concepts to bridge mind and world, as McDowell has it. For as
Heidegger’s analyses of worldhood show, and likewise Merleau-Ponty’s rich
examples  of  bodily  intentionality,  these  elements  are  never  distinct  to  start
with.  Although this  perspective is  certainly understandable,  Dreyfus’s  main
arguments miss their targets,  and this has not gone unnoticed by all  of the
other authors. Schear (pp. 285-302) is the only one who, toward the end of the
book, attempts to save the largest part of Dreyfus’s non-conceptualist reading.
Schear lines up with Dreyfus in asserting that skillful  coping constitutes an
important  exception  to  the  conceptualist  rule  and  that  it  cannot  be
appropriated in McDowell’s framework. This is the syllogism that is supposed
to provide the non-conceptualist’s argument:
(1) The capacity for rationality requires the presence of determinate objects.
(2)  The  merging  character  of  absorbed  coping  precludes  the  presence  of
determinate objects.
(3) Absorbed coping is thus not available to the capacity for rationality.
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(4) Therefore, it is not the case that human beings are essentially rational in
the strong sense. (p. 294) 
But the argument is bound to fail. The reason for this is that both Schear and
Dreyfus  wrongly  assume that  claim (1)  is  endorsed  by  McDowell,  while  it
clearly  is  not  –  something  Crane,  Noë  and  McDowell  himself  had  already
pointed out earlier in the book. The conceptual capacities McDowell believes
are involved in all experience does not demand that determinate objects stand
over against a subject, as claim (1) suggests. McDowell would accept that I do
not have to conceptualize a  basketball  that I  am trying to catch in order to
successfully catch it.  His point  is  that concepts are  passively drawn upon in
skillful coping rather than being actively employed. Catching a basketball, like
using a doorknob, is an absorbed action that cannot be performed without the
relevant  background  knowledge  having  been  developed  by  a  process  of
Bildung or cultural development. Although I do not need to actively think that
this is a basketball, every aspect of me catching it, including that I am doing it
on  a  basketball  field  in  a  city’s  park  in  a  sports  outfit,  is  entrenched with
rationality. The (true) claim that absorbed coping knows no fully determinate
objects is, therefore, irrelevant to McDowell’s position. Whatever we name the
indeterminate objects  that  do play a part  here,  it  would have been entirely
impossible for them to appear the way they do were they not invested with
second nature.
Dreyfus  is  completely  consistent  in  saying  that  absorbed  copings  are  not
conceptual  if  he  takes  that  to  mean  that  they  do  not  require  a  subject
thematizing an object. But McDowell never denied this. The kind of conceptual
involvement  McDowell  has  in  mind  can  do  perfect  justice  to  the
phenomenology  of  absorbed  coping,  for  it  does  not  rely  on  a  kind  of
subject/object distinction characteristic of a propositional attitude. Although,
as Crane (p. 230) rightly remarks, McDowell still speaks of the propositional
content of intuition in  Mind and World – a claim he would later drop under
pressure of Travis5 – I think it is unlikely that McDowell at any point believed
such an intentional stance to be necessary for his conceptualism. Already in
Mind and World, the idea was that «the relevant conceptual capacities are drawn
on in receptivity»6,  which means that  they are  passive,  rather than actively
executed by the subject. 
Dreyfus’s  critical  argument  from  absorbed  coping  is  rejected  not  only  by
McDowell (pp. 41-56) but also by his fellow phenomenologists Noë (pp. 178-
5 TRAVIS 2004.
6 MCDOWELL 1994, p. 9.
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182)  and  Crane  (p.  230).  Noë  thinks  phenomenology  is  supportive  of
conceptualism,  saying  that  «there  is  no  such  thing  as  how  things  look
independently of the larger context of thought, feeling and interests» (p. 189)
and also that «experience is itself a kind of thought» (p. 180). But Noë does not
think that these descriptions are incompatible with the general direction into
which Dreyfus is moving. Dreyfus’s arguments from absorbed coping do not
contradict the idea that our intellectual capacities structure the environment
and the practices in which we passively engage.
Rouse  (pp.  250-267)  has  a  particularly  fruitful  way  of  articulating  the
misunderstanding that obtains between Dreyfus and McDowell. As I stipulated
already at  the  opening of  this  paper,  McDowell’s  lead motives  for favoring
conceptualism  have  little  to  do  with  giving  a  proper  descriptive-
phenomenological  account  of  mental  content.  Rouse  to  my  mind  correctly
asserts that whereas McDowell is interested in a  normative account of mental
content, Dreyfus focuses solely on description. This helps explain their different
stances.  For  McDowell,  to  play  a  game  of  basketball  must  be  to  passively
employ relevant concepts,  for it is impossible for a non-cultivated animal to
play this game. For Dreyfus, on the other hand, to play basketball is to «become
one with» a  «phenomenal field» (p. 17): it  is a skillful action that lacks the
subject/object  distance  suitable  to  describe  conceptual  activities  with.  Both
accounts need not be incompatible. Dreyfus and McDowell may agree both on
the descriptive as well as on the normative aspects, as long as both are neatly
separated.  Basically,  then,  although  Rouse  does  not  put  it  that  way,  the
McDowell/Dreyfus-Debate would be largely the result of a misunderstanding
on Dreyfus’s behalf.
Whether  this  is  indeed  the  case  or  not,  it  deserves  emphasis  that  The
McDowell/Dreyfus-Debate  contains  a  wide  variety  of  interesting  viewpoints
concerning the relation between phenomenology and non-conceptual content,
with both contemporary analytic and historical assessments (Taylor, pp. 61-90;
Pippin, pp. 91-109; Gardner, pp. 110-142; Braver 143-162). A great deal of the
more analytically oriented chapters, such as those by Noë (pp. 178-193), Siewert
(pp.  194-226),  Crane  (pp.  229-249)  and  Schellenberg  (pp.  272-282)  make
valuable  readings  for  anyone  interested  in  either  phenomenology  or
philosophy of mind. Crane and Zahavi (pp. 320-343) also briefly touch upon
the issues  of  representationalism and intentionalism, which constitute other
sub-fields  of  contemporary  philosophy  of  mind  to  which  phenomenology
might still have a lot to contribute.
All  in all,  The  McDowell-Dreyfus  Debate  presents  a  collection of  papers  by
outstanding  phenomenological  philosophers  which  doubtlessly  succeeds  in
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deepening  ongoing  debates.  In  spite  of  this,  however,  one  cannot  help  but
feeling slightly disappointed by the way the book has been set up around the
opening debate.  Apart  from the central  misunderstanding,  it  is,  I  think,  far
from  obvious  that  McDowell  is  the  right  philosopher  to  start  a
phenomenological debate about non-conceptual content with. Hardly any of
the phenomenological contributors to the book focus on those philosophical
problems in the light of which McDowell discusses conceptualism. It would
have been interesting to see these outstanding philosophers engage with other
recent work as well, especially more empirically and psychologically oriented
literature. A second potential though perhaps minor setback for any reader is
that  Husserl’s  phenomenological  work is  more  or  less  excluded from these
discussions.  It  is  still  an  open  question  what  Husserl  has  to  offer  to
contemporary debates over non-conceptual content, and possibly an important
one as well, given that Husserl’s phenomenological approach is undoubtedly
more systematic than that of Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty. Also, certain genetic
phenomenological notions such as “types”, “habitualization” and “secondary
passivity”  bear  obvious  resemblances  with  McDowellean  ideas  like  second
nature.  In  spite  of  these  concerns,  one may consider  The  McDowell-Dreyfus
Debate  obliged  literature  for  anyone  interested  in  the  crossover  between
phenomenology and philosophy of mind.
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